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SADDLED WITH A LAME HORSE? WHY
STATE CONSUMER PROTECTION LAWS
CAN BE THE BEST PROTECTION FOR
DUPED HORSE PURCHASERS
Abstract: Many first-time horse purchasers have little experience with
the equine industry and are thus vulnerable to the use of deceptive and
unfair practices by the more knowledgeable seller. In situations where
inexperienced horse purchasers are duped into buying ill or otherwise
defective horses, there are two potential claims that purchasers can
make for relief: U.C.C. claims or state consumer protection act claims
("CPAs"). Because courts in U.C.C. claims cases tend to focus on the
contractual relationship between the parties, inexperienced horse pur-
chasers' relief through the U.C.C. is often limited. Indeed, the goal of
the U.C.C. is to regulate relationships between buyers and sellers and to
encourage thier freedom to contract. The goal of CPAs, on the other
hand, is to address unfair and deceptive trade practices. This Note will
argue that duped purchasers should always file CPA claims rather than
U.C.C. claims against unscrupulous horse sellers because of the greater
protection and broader relief CPAs have to offer.
INTRODUCTION
Contrary to popular opinion, not all horse owners are wealthy
businesspeople with experience in the equine industry.' In reality,
many horse purchasers are first-time buyers with little or no such ex-
perience. 2 Often, they seek a reliable horse for recreation or occa-
sional showing, not a million-dollar racehorse or grand prix winners
Novice horse purchasers typically do not know how to select a suitable
horse and instead rely on a horse seller's advice when making a pur-
chase.4 Serious legal problems can arise when unscrupulous horse
sellers take advantage of these inexperienced purchasers by selling
them defective horses.5
I Sec Dennis Tilton. Fraud in the Sale of a Show Hone, 39 An. juR. TRIALS 527, 541
(1989).
2 Id.
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Consider the following hypothetical: Abigail Miller is a ten-year-
old girl with dreams of one day becoming a famous Olympic equestri-
enne.6
 Her parents have no prior experience with horses but encour-
age her dream by funding riding lessons twice a week at a local stable.
For Abigail's eleventh birthday; her parents decide to buy her a show
pony that requires little training and can win at jumping events. The
Millers learn about a local stable from its advertisement in a newspa-
per stating that it specializes in selling show jumping ponies for chil-
dren of all riding capabilities.
Abigail and her parents go to the stable and see Buttercup—an
adorable palomino pony—and instantly fall in love with him. When
Mr. Johnson, the owner of the stable, tells the Millers that Buttercup is
the son of two very successful show ponies and is an impressive
jumper, Abigail's parents know they have found the perfect pony and
buy him for $10,000.
Soon after the pony arrives at the Millers' stable, however, he be-
comes lame and unrideable. The Millers' veterinarian informs them
that Buttercup has weak tendons and should not be used for jumping
but could be a nice trail horse. Devastated, the Millers attempt to re-
turn Buttercup to the stable. Mr. Johnson acknowledges that he was
aware of the pony's tendon problems, but refuses to return their
money, showing the Millers a copy of the contract they signed. The
contract contains several bold-typed disclaimers against all warranties,
stating that the pony was sold "as is." In addition, Mr. Johnson denies
making any guarantees about the pony's capabilities and argues that
he did not say anything false—it is literally true that Buttercup is an
impressive jumper.
Horse purchasers in the Millers' situation, stuck with an undesir-
able equine, might have some legal remedies against sellers like Mr.
Johnson.? Like the Millers, a growing number of horse owners in the
United States want to own a successful competitor; yet, many of these
people are not active in the equine industry, lack basic horsemanship
skills, and do not have the ability to select a prospective champion. 8
These new horse purchasers are likely to rely on sellers' representa-
tions and therefore are particularly susceptible to deception and un-
fair practices throughout an equine sales transaction . 9
6 The author created this fictitious hypothetical.
7 SCE Tilton, supra note 1, at 541.
8 See id.
9 Sec id.
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Crooked horse dealers have existed for hundreds of years, from a
time when people used horses for transportation and farming, to the
present, when people primarily use horses for recreation and compe-
tition.° It is not uncommon for an unscrupulous horse seller to take
advantage of inexperienced, first-time horse purchasers like the Mill-
ers by convincing them to purchase a horse with a latent, undisclosed
physical defect that will make the horse unable to meet the pur-
chaser's expectations."
Traditionally, courts applied the doctrine of caveat emptor—let
the buyer beware—in equine sales, leaving both experienced and in-
experienced purchasers with unwanted, defective horses.° Most. mod-
ern courts find more equitable solutions for purchasers in claims
brought under the Uniform Commercial Code (“U.C.C.") or com-
mon law.° Recently, courts have begun to consider whether state con-
sumer protection acts ("CPAs") apply in equine sale disputes."
Although CPAs often provide a viable cause of action for de-
ceived horse purchasers, practitioners in equine-related disputes typi-
cally have avoided analyzing the application of CPAs and instead have
focused on claims under the U.C.C. 15 Courts interpreting the U.C.C.,
however, fail to protect unsophisticated horse purchasers in many
situations by focusing on the contractual relationship between pur-
chaser and seller and assuming that both parties are knowledgeable of
the equine industry.° Courts applying CPAs, on the other hand, pro-
tect purchasers more broadly and flexibly than those applying the
I(t JULIE 1. FERSHTMAN, EQUINE LAW & HORSE SENSE 41 (1996).
II See id.
IS See John Alan Cohan, The Uniform Commercial Code as Applied to Implied Warranties of
"Merchantability" and "Fitness" in the Sale of Horses, 73 Ky. L.J. 665, 681 (1984); Robert S.
Miller, The Sale of Horses and Horse Interests: A Transactional Approach, 78 Ky. L.J. 517, 576
(1989/1990).
15 See Miller, supra note 12, at 521-23; sec also FERSITTMAN, supra note 10, at 45 (stating
that aggrieved horse purchasers can sue sellers for common-law claims such as breach of
contract or fraud). Horse purchasers can also pursue claims under other federal and state
statutes, such as the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, which regulates warranties and reme-
dies. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (2000); Miller, supra note 12, at 551.
H See, e.g., FERSIITMAN, supra note 10, at 45 (discussing the potential application of
CPAs in such transactions).
15 See id.; sec also John J. Kropp et al„ Horse Sense and the UCG: The Purchase of Racehorses,
1 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 171, 199 (1991) (stating that the possible applicability of state con-
sumer protection statutes should not be overlooked, but because such statutes vary from
state to state, it is difficult to determine how they generally impact the equine industry);
Miller, supra note 12, at 551 (noting that legislative declarations of policies, such as con-
sumer protection acts, have potential importance to equine sales transactions).
16 See Miller, supra note 12, at 533 n.117.
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U.C.C. by focusing on standards of unfairness and deception, rather
than the contractual relationship.r Thus, CPAs are more likely to
help novice horse purchasers who, like the Millers, unwittingly con-
tract away their rights.°
To understand how CPAs can better protect novice horse pur-
chasers than the U.C.C., this Note examines the application of both
types of statutes and their available remedies in equine sales transac-
tions.° Part I explains the application of the U.C.C. to equine sales
transactions and analyzes particular aspects of the U.C.C. that deal
with deceived horse purchasers' possible rights and remedies. 2° Part II
examines the application of CPAs to equine sales transactions and dis-
cusses the rights and remedies CPAs provide deceived horse purchas-
ers.21
 Part III compares how the U.C.C. and CPAs protect horse pur-
chasers and argues that CPAs provide more thorough protection and
relief for novice horse purchasers than the U.C,C. 22 This leads to the
conclusion that deceived, novice horse purchasers should always con-
sider filing a CPA claim against a deceptive horse seller. 23
I. THE U.C.C. AND ITS APPLICATION TO EQUINE SALES
A. General Application of the U.C.C. to Equine Sales
The U.C.C. regulates relationships between purchasers and sell-
ers to encourage freedom of contract and the continued expansion of
commercial transactions. 24
 Article 2 of the U.C.C., which applies to
transactions in goods, is the most relevant article dealing with con-
tractual matters such as horse sales. 25
 The U.C.C. characterizes sales of
horses and unborn or future foals as transactions in goods, 26
 Conse-
quently, the doctrines laid out in Article 2 apply to equine sales. 27
17 See JONATHAN SHELDON & CAROLYN L. CARTEL UNFAIR AND DECEP'I1VE ACTS AND
PRAUFICES 31 (3d ed. 1991).
3 See id.
19 See infra notes 24-261 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 24-129 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 130-261 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 262-329 and accompanying text.
23 See infra note 330 and accompanying text.
24 U.C.C. § 1-102(2) (2000); See JONATHAN SIIELDON & CAROLYN L. CARTER, CON-
SUMER WARRANTY LAW 52 (1997).
22
 See U.C.C. § 2 (2000); Cohan, supra note 12, at 666-67. Every state except Louisiana
has adopted Article 2 of the U.C.C. Cohan, supra note 12, at 665.
26 Kropp, supra note 15, at 174. For example, Vermont's U.C.C. defines "goods" as "all
things ... which are movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale....
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One of the most basic of these doctrines is the Statute of Frauds,
which requires that contracts for sales of goods in excess of $500 be in
writing.28 Accordingly, a contract for the sale of a horse for more than
$500 is enforceable if it is in writing and is signed by the party against
whom enforcement is sought. 29 One exception to the Statute of
Frauds requirement is if there is a written memorandum confirming
the agreement, the transaction is between merchants, and neither
party objects in writing to the memorandum in a timely manner." A
merchant in the equine industry has, or is perceived to have, knowl-
edge or skills particular to the type of horse he or she is buying or sell-
ing. 31 Many people in the equine industry fall into this category. 32
Furthermore, courts will impute merchant. status to non-merchants if
a broker or knowledgeable friend helps with the purchase, which is a
common practice.33
Other exceptions to the Statute of Frauds requirement do exist. 34
Among them, section 2-201(3)(c) of the U.C,C. is particularly rele-
vant to equine sales." Under this section, if a party to the transaction
has received and accepted either payment or the horse, a court can
enforce the contract regardless of a violation of the Statute of
Frauds." Thus, even oral agreements, or those in which neither party
is a merchant, bind the parties after one performs without the other's
'Goods' also includes the unborn young of animals ...." VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9A, § 2-105
(1994).
27 See Kropp, supra note 15, at 176.
28 See U.C.C. § 2-201(1); Kropp, supra note 15, at 176.
28 U.C.C. § 2-201 (1); Kropp, supra note 15, at 176; see, e.g., McClure v. Duggan, 674 F.
Stipp. 211, 218-19 (N.D. Tex. 1987) (concluding that a breach of contract cause of action
was unsupportable because the plaintiff, who sued the defendant for failure to sell the
plaintiff a racehorse for $600,000, failed to establish that a signed, written memorandum
existed; thus, any contract that may have existed was unenforceable because it failed to
comply with the Statute of Frauds).
U.C.C. § 2-201(2); Kropp, supra note 15, at 176.
51 KIWI), supra note 15, at 176-77 n.31. For example, a court would consider someone
who professionally sells Appaloosa western trail horses a merchant of that type of horse but
not a merchant of Thoroughbred racehorses, unless he or she also has knowledge particu-
lar to the Thoroughbred industry. Cohan, supra note 12, at 670.
32 See Cohan, supra note 12, at 669. Courts likely would not consider an inexperienced
or casual seller of a horse a merchant for the purposes of the implied warranty of mer-
chantability, while a person who buys and sells horses for profit is a merchant for these
purposes, whether or not this is his or her first sale. Id. at 669-70.
53 Id. at 671.
54 See U.C.C. § 2-201(3); Kropp, supra note 15, at 177.
55 Sec U.C.C. § 2-201(3) (c); Kropp, supra note 15, at 177.
86 See U.C.C. § 2-201(3)(c); Kropp, supra note 15, at 177.
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objection.37
 This is critical in equine sales, which are often completed
by a handshake in private verbal negotiations or a nod of the head at
a public auction.38
A written contract, however, is always preferable in equine sales. 39
The U.C.C. provides that the written contract is the primary source
for determining the terms of a sale. 4° Written terms may be explained
or supplemented by evidence of consistent additional terms; conse-
quently, evidence of prior or contemporaneous oral agreements be-
tween the horse purchaser and seller can be admitted into evidence
should a subsequent dispute arise, as long as they do not contradict
the written contract.'" In addition, course of dealing, customs in the
.equine industry, or course of performance can explain or supplement
written terms of a contract. 42
 For example, if the parties have dealt
with one another during prior equine sales transactions, courts can
interpret unclear or disputed terms in light of those prior transac-
tions. 43
The rules regarding written contracts apply not only to private
equine sales but also to public horse auctions:" Most auction houses
require horse purchasers to sign an acknowledgment of purchase
soon after the completion of any sale. 45
 Sellers also sign consignment
contracts, which make sales contingent upon receipt of final bids.48
Yet, auction sales of horses differ froth private sales in several re-
spects.47
 For example, auctions employ a competitive bidding format,
so purchasers and sellers rarely meet." The most significant differ-
ence, however, is that an auction company typically establishes the
terms of the contract between the parties in its Conditions of Sale,
printed in its sales catalog.49
 The Conditions of Sale include the war-
ranties and warranty disclaimer provisions included in the terms and
conditions of most purchase contracts.50
57
 Kropp, supra note 15, at 177.
58
 See Miller, supra note 12, at 537.
" See Kropp, supra note 15, at 179.
4° See U .C.C.§ 2-202; Kropp, supra note 15, at 180.
41
 U.C.C. § 2-202; Kropp, supra note 15, at 180-81.
42 Sec U .C.C.§ 2-202(a).
" See id.; Kropp, supra note 15, at 182-83.
44 See Kropp, supra note 15, at 177.
45 Miller, supra note 12, at 538.
4° Id.
47 See Kropp, supra note 15, at 177-78.
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In private equine sales, however, purchase contracts occasionally
do not contain any warranty or disclaimer of warranty provisions."
The existence of such warranties is crucial in determining whether an
unsatisfied purchaser can obtain relief upon discovering that a horse
is unhealthy or unsuitable for the purposes for which it was pur-
chased.52 Many disputes between purchasers and sellers revolve
around whether an express or implied warranty exists, and if so,
whether a breach has occurred.53 Thus, determining whether a duped
horse purchaser should file a U.C.C. claim requires an understanding
of the available warranties under the U.C.C. and the remedies they
provide in equine sales disputes. 54
B. Warranties and Remedies for Horse Purchasers Under the U. C. C.
Upon discovering a defect, unsatisfied horse purchasers have two
main methods of relief under the U.C.C. 55 A purchaser can try to re-
scind a purchase by either rejecting the horse or revoking acceptance
of the horse. 58 Rescission by either method requires the seller to re-
turn the purchase price to the purchaser in exchange for the return
of the defective horse. 57 Alternatively, a purchaser can seek damages
for breach of warranty. 58
Most unsatisfied horse purchasers prefer rescission because they
do not want to continue paying for a horse that has failed to meet
their expectations. 59 Rescission can be an insufficient remedy, how-
ever, because it has severe time constraints and therefore often does
not apply.° For example, a purchaser can reject a horse for failure to
conform to the contract only if the purchaser does so prior to accep-
tance of the horse and within a reasonable time after the horse's de-
livery." Once the purchaser accepts the horse, the purchaser can only
revoke acceptance within a reasonable time after the purchaser dis-
covers, or should have discovered, the nonconformity. 62
51 Id. at 179-80.
52 SCC Kropp, supra note 15, at 184.
53 See id.
54 Sec infra notes 55-129 and accompanying text.
55 SeeU .C.C. §§ 2-601(a), 2-608 (2000); Kropp, supra note 15, at 196.
56 SeeU .C.C. §§ 2-601(a), 2-608; Kropp, supra note 15, at 196.
57 See U.C.C. § 2-711; Kropp, supra note 15, at 196.
53 See U.C.C. § 2-714; Kropp, supra note 15, at 196.
59 Miller, supra note 12, at 547.
60 See Kropp, supra note 15, at 196-97.
61 U.C.C. §§ 2-601, 2-602; Kropp, supra note 15, at 196.
62 U.C.C. § 2-608(2); Kropp, supra note 15, at 196.
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After the time of revocation has passed—usually a very brief win-
dow of opportunity—a horse purchaser who learns of a defect can
still obtain relief in an action for damages against the seller for breach
of express or implied warranties." In pursuing such an action, the
purchaser must notify the seller of the defect in a timely manner and
must be able to establish the existence and breach of such warran-
ties." This notice allows the seller to mitigate damages or correct the
problem and protects the seller from old claims."
To prove that the horse seller created an express warranty, the
purchaser must show that the seller promised or represented, either
orally or in writing, that the horse possessed certain desired quali-
ties. 67
 Such representations are significant because they often induce a
purchaser to buy a horse." For example, in 1086, in Alpert v. Thomas,
the United States District Court for the District of Vermont concluded
that the seller created an express warranty that induced the purchaser
to buy a stallion for breeding purposes by stating that the farm would
conduct a breeding soundness evaluation and by assuring the pur-
chaser that the stallion was "breeding sound."69 When the stallion
failed to impregnate mares, the purchaser successfully revoked accep-
tance, and the court awarded the purchaser the return of the pur-
chase price already paid plus interest, as well as over $25,000 in ex-
penses incurred in transportation, care, custody, and insurance of the
stallion."
Frequently horse sellers unintentionally create express warranties
when they make oral statements in connection with the sale of a
horse. 71
 In such instances, courts must distinguish between mere
puffing—exaggerating in an entertaining manner—or trade talk, nei-
63 See Miron v. Yonkers Raceway, Inc., 400 F.2d 112,118-19 (2d Cir. 1968) (concluding
that the purchaser could not revoke acceptance one day following the purchase of the
horse). But see Alpert v. Thomas, 643 F. Supp. 1406,1909,1412 (D. Vt. 1986) (concluding
that the purchaser's revocation of the contract more than one year after the horse pur-
chase was within a reasonable time because the seller had repeatedly assured the pur-
chaser to follow the doctor's "wait-and-see" advice).
64 Kropp, supra note 15, at 197-98; see U.C.C. § 2-714.
65
 Kropp, supra note 15, at 198; seeU.C.C. § 2-714.
66 Cohan, supra note 12, at 682. Also to prevent old claims, the statute of limitations
imposed by the U.C.C. requires that a party commence a breach of warranty claim within
four years after accrual of the cause of action. U.C.C. § 2-725(1).
67 See U.C.C. § 2-313; Cohan, supra note 12, at 688.
615 See Miller, supra note 12, at 594.
69 643 F. Supp. at 1414-15.
70 Id. at 1412,1420.
71
 Kropp, supra note 15, at 184-85.
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Cher of which creates express warranties, and an affirmation of a fact
about the horse, which does create an express warranty." This distinc-
tion is subjective and depends on the specific circumstances in each
case and the preferences of the court." For example, in 1977, in Sessa
v. Riegle, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania found that the seller's statement, "the horse is sound,w 74
spoken to the purchaser during a telephone conversation, constituted
an opinion rather than an express warranty.'" On the other hand, in
1965, in Norton v. Lindsay, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit concluded that a statement regarding a horse's sound-
ness was an express warranty because it implied that the horse had no
defects that would frustrate the purposes for which the purchaser
bought it." Courts frequently determine that predictions about a
horse's future are mere puffing because such statements by their na-
ture are purely speculative and therefore cannot. create express war-
ranties."
When a seller induces a purchaser to buy a horse by stating or
affirming that the horse has certain desirable characteristics that it
does not have, and the court does not consider such statements mere
puffing., the purchaser can sue for a breach of express warranty. 78 For
example, in 1988, in Travis v. Washington Horse Breeders Ass'it, the Su-
preme Court of Washington upheld such a claim." In Travis, the sell-
ers assured the purchaser of the horse's health and its fitness for rac-
ing and breeding, yet one week after the sale, the purchaser learned
that the horse had a heart murmur and thus could not carry a rider. 80
The court concluded that the horse sellers' statement constituted an
express warranty that induced the purchaser to buy the horse; there-
72 See id, at 185.
73 See id.
74 In the equine industry, a horse with no physical problems related to its performance
ability is referred to as "sound," while a horse with problems is "unsound.' See Cohan, RIM
note 12, at 675.
75 See 427 F. Stipp. 760. 765 (ED. Pa. 1977).
78 See 350 F.2d 46, 49 (10th Cir. 1965).
77 See, e.g., Frederickson v. Hackney, 198 N.W. 806, 807 (Minn. 1924) (concluding that
it was impossible to create an implied warranty regarding an immature bull's future breed-
ing capacity because such a characteristic was impossible to predict).
78 See Kropp, supra note 15, at 184.
75 See 759 P.2d 418, 422 (Wash. 1988).
85 Id. at 419.
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fore, the court upheld the purchaser's breach of express warranty
claim.81
In addition to express warranties, three types of implied warran-
ties under the U.C.C. frequently arise in equine sales disputes. 82
 The
first applicable implied warranty is that the title conveyed is good, its
transfer is rightful, and the horse is free of any encumbrance.° This
warranty is relevant to equine sales because liens and security interests
often attach to expensive horses.° Also, sellers occasionally sell horses
that they do not actually own, and questions of title emerge.°
A more commonly disputed implied warranty in equine transac-
tions is the warrant),
 of merchantability.° As applied to equine sales,
barters, or exchanges, this warranty provides that the purchased horse
must conform to its contract description and must be fit for the ordi-
nary purposes for which it is used. 87
 Frequently there is a breach of
the implied warranty of merchantability in equine sales if the horse
has a physical problem making it unsuitable for its intended commer-
cial purpose and therefore unmerchantable.°
The implied warranty of merchantability demands strict liability,
so courts will hold horse sellers liable regardless of their lack of
knowledge or inability to discover the defect upon reasonable inspec-
tion.° Sellers must be merchants, however, for a warranty of mer-
81 See id. at 422. The defendant argued that the express warranty had been disclaimed
by the Conditions of Sale of the auction, but the court determined that it would be unrea-
sonable to allow a disclaimer for the express warranty in this case. See id.
82 See U .C.C. §§ 2-312(1), 2-314,2-315 (2000); Kropp, supra note 15, at 186-87. Im-
plied warranties are not always available to dissatisfied horse purchasers, as many states
limit their scope in livestock sales. Cohan, supra note 12, at 686; Kropp, supra note 15, at
192. These states are: Arkansas, California, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kan-
sas, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota. Okla-
homa, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Texas. Sec Cohan, supra note 12, at 686
n.131; Kropp, supra note 15, at 192 nn.123-24.
83
 See U.C.C. § 2-312(1); Kropp, supra note 15, at 186.
84 Kropp, supra note 15, at 186.
86
 Sec Miller, supra note 12, at 524.
86
 SCCU,C.C. § 2-314; Kropp, supra note 15, at 186-88.
87 Cohan, supra note 12, at 673; see U.C.C. § 2-314. When the seller knows that the
purchaser wants to use the horse for breeding, courts will find an implied warranty of mer-
chantability that a stallion has the capability of impregnating a mare or that a mare has the
capability of giving birth to a live foal. Cohan. supra note 12, at 677.
88 See Cohan, supra note 12, at 673, Such physical problems include, but are not lim- •
ited to: "blindness, deafness, one leg being shorter than another, lameness, and infection
with a contagious disease." Id. at 675. If the horse can be restored to its usual and reason-
able use, then a court will not consider it unmerchantable, even if it ultimately cannot
meet the purchaser's expectations. Id. at 676.
89
 See id. at 673.
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chantability to apply." Sellers also can modify or exclude this warranty
by oral statement or a conspicuous writing that includes the term
"merchantability."91 Moreover, purchasers are deemed to have waived
the warranty of merchantability if they know of a defect at the time of
purchase.92
The third type of implied warranty—guaranteeing fitness for a
particular purpose—does not require that the seller be a merchant. 93
To establish a claim for this warranty, a purchaser must demonstrate a
seller's awareness that the purchaser bought the horse for a particular
purpose other than its ordinary purpose and did so in reliance on the
seller's skill and knowledge in choosing an appropriate horse for that
particular purpose.94 The purchaser's reliance on the seller is the
most important element in determining whether an implied warranty
of fitness for a particular purpose exists. 95 There is, however, no uni-
form standard of deciding whether the purchaser reasonably relied
on the seller, 96 In some cases, courts have found an implied warranty
of fitness for a particular purpose even though the purchaser should
have recognized the unreasonableness of relying on the seller. 97 In
other cases, in which a purchaser could have reasonably relied on a
seller's statements but instead mainly relied on statements by the pur-
chaser's own agent, courts have found no such warranty." Finally,
99 Id. at 667. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text for a discussion of the term
"merchant." For example, in Alpert v. Thomas, the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Vermont concluded that the sellers were merchants for purposes of the implied
warranty of merchantability because they held themselves out as having knowledge and
skills peculiar to the practices and goods involved in the Arabian horse business." 643 F.
Stipp. at 1415-16.
91 Cohan, supra note 12, at 683-89.
92 Id. at 676.
93 Id. at 678; sec U.C.G. § 2-315.
94 Cohan, supra note 12, at 678-79; see U .C.C. § 2-315. For example, a Thoroughbred
used for racing is an ordinary purpose, but a Thoroughbred used for western-style trail
riding is a particular purpose. See Cohan, supra note 12, at 679.
96 Cohan, supra note 12, at 679.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 680; see, e.g., Woodruff v, Clark County Farm Bureau Co-op. Ass'n, 286 N.E.2d
188,190,195 (Ind. Ct. App. 1972) (concluding that a material issue of fact existed as to
the possible violations of the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose when the
purchaser relied on the seller's statements of the chickens' good health, despite the pur-
chaser's observations on two occasions that the chickens he intended to purchase were
underfed and looked unhealthy).
99 See, e.g., Sessa, 427 F. Stipp. at 766,770 (concluding that the purchaser's reliance on
his agent overrode any reasonable reliance on the seller, who knew the purchaser in-
tended to use the horse for racing and told the purchaser that the horse was sound when
in fact he was not).
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some courts, reasoning that a seller is in no better position to know
the fitness of the horse than a purchaser, occasionally will apply the
doctrine of caveat emptor rather than find sufficient reliance."
Like the implied warranty of merchantability, the implied war-
ranty of fitness for a particular purpose bears strict liability that a
seller can disclaim.'" For example, in Travis, the Supreme Court of
Washington declined to find either an implied warranty of merchant-
ability or an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose be-
cause the Conditions of Sale in the auction catalog effectively dis-
claimed all implied warranties by making the warranties available for
all purchasers to read."' Although such disclaimers extinguish im-
plied warranties most directly, other ways to extinguish them do ex-
ist. 102
 In the equine industry, a purchaser's examination of a horse to
the purchaser's satisfaction negates any implied warranties.'" This
examination exception often applies in situations such as auctions,
where purchasers or their veterinarians customarily examine horses
prior to purchase.'" For example, in 1989, in Cohen v. North Ridge
Farms, Inc., the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Kentucky concluded that the purchaser assumed the risk of loss be-
cause he acted in conscious ignorance by electing to purchase the
horse without requesting a pre-sale examination, which would have
shown the horse's respiratory problems.'"
Similarly, a refusal of a seller's invitation to examine a horse prior
to entering a contract is another type of examination exception.'" If a
purchaser refuses to conduct an examination that would not have re-
vealed the defect at issue, however, a court may still grant the pur-
99
 Cohan, supra note 12, at 681.
100 See id.
1 ° 1
 759 P.2d at 422; see also Cohen v. North Ridge Farms, Inc., 712 F. Stipp. 1265, 1269
(E.D. Ky. 1989) (declining to allow the plaintiff's request for rescission because the Condi-
tions of Sale in the auction catalog "put plaintiff on notice that (1) this yearling was sold
with no warranty, express or implied, and (2) there was no guarantee as to the 'soundness,
condition, wind or other quality' of the yearling, and (3) the yearling was being sold 'as-is'
102 See Kropp, supra note 15, at 194.
1 °3 Id.; see U.C.C. § 2-316(3) (b) (2000).
109
	 Cohan, supra note 12, at 685.
105 712 F. Supp. at 1274.
106 Cohan, supra note 12, at 685; see U .C.C.§ 2-316(3) (b); see, e.g., Calloway v. Manion,
572 F.2d 1033, 1035 & n.2 (5th Cir. 1978) (finding that the purchaser refused the seller's
demand that he inspect the horse prior to the sale and, consequently, that refusal was
sufficient to bar recovery for any defect that an examination would have revealed—in this
case, the presence of an imperfectly formed ovary).
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chaser relief." Moreover, if the seller actively conceals a defect that
one could normally observe upon inspection, the implied warranty
applies."
In addition to disclaimers and the examination exception, horse
sellers can limit potential remedies for purchasers within the con-
tract." A limitation on remedies restricts the purchaser's available
remedies even when there could he a valid breach of warranty
claim. 110 For example, in 1978, in Calloway v. Manion, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld a jury finding that
the plaintiff had contractually limited his remedy for a breach of ex-
press warranty and thus could not receive relief under Texas's
U.C.C."" In Calloway, the plaintiff and defendant swapped horses and
orally agreed that if the mare the plaintiff received in exchange for a
gelding" 2 was unsatisfactory, his sole remedy would be to return the
mare in exchange for a $10,000 credit on another, higher-priced
horse. 115 The court rejected the plaintiffs U.C.C. claim, concluding
that a jury could reasonably find that. the plaintiffs failure to pursue
this limited remedy was enough to invalidate the breach of express
warranty
Occasionally, courts will find such remedy limitations or dis-
claimers unconscionable and therefore may not enforce them." 5 A
horse purchaser can argue the unconscionability of a contract based
on inadequate consideration or unequal bargaining power."° In an
equine sales transaction, however, courts rarely strike contractual pro-
visions to which both parties have agreed.'" Courts impute a high
level of understanding and sophistication to parties involved in these
sales transactions; therefore, they usually find that the parties willingly
agreed to all the terms of a contract, even those that may seem un-
fair. 118
107 Cohan, supra note 12, at 685.
108 Id. at 686. A hypothetical example of this active concealment is if, prior to the ex-
amination, the seller injects a chronically lame horse with a drug to lessen the visual signs
of unsoundness, thereby deceiving the purchaser.
100 SceU,C,C, § 2-719(1)(a).
no See Calloway. 572 F.2d at 1035,1038.
"I See id.
112 A gelding is a male horse that has been castrated.
115 Sec 572 F.2d at 1035,1037.
114 See id. at 1035,1038.
115 See Millet; supra note 12, at 531.
116 Sce id. at 529-30.
117 See id. at 530.
116 See id. at 530-31.
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When remedies are not limited, and disclaimers do not prevent
relief, a successful horse purchaser can receive damages for a breach
of warranty. 119 Courts typically calculate damages for breach of ex-
press or implied warranties by determining the difference, at the time
and place of acceptance, between the value of the horse as is and the
value the horse would have had in its warranted condition. 12° Occa-
sionally the purchaser can also receive consequential damages for
transportation, insurance, stud fees, care, and training costs. 121 The
U.C.C., however, provides no recovery of attorney's fees. 122
The contract-based remedies available under the U.C.C. reflect
the main purposes of the U.C.C., which include simplifying, clarify-
ing, and modernizing the law governing commercial transactions and
permitting the continued expansion of commercial practices through
custom, usage, and agreement between the parties. 123 These purposes
show that the U.C.C. protects the relationship between purchasers
and sellers by encouraging freedom of contract. 124 Encouraging free-
dom of contract, however, fails to protect unsophisticated horse pur-
chasers who unwittingly agree to contracts with unfavorable terms. 125
Consequently, the U.C.C. does not always provide adequate protec-
tion for novice horse purchasers. 12°
Whereas state legislatures have enacted the U.C.C. to protect
freedom of contract, state legislatures have enacted CPAs to prevent
deception and abuses against consumers in the marketplace. 127 Thus,
CPAs often provide unsophisticated horse purchasers better remedies
ng See U.C.C. § 2-714 (2000); Kropp, supra note 15, at 197-99.
1211 U.C.C. § 2-714(2); Kropp, supra note 15, at 198. Compare Cronin v. Bacon, 837
S.W.2d 265, 269-70 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (calculating breach of warranty damages based
on the difference in value between a prospective foal sired by the stallion to whom the
purchaser believed his mare was being bred and the value of a prospective foal sired by the
stallion to whom the purchaser's mare actually was bred), with Yost v. Millhouse, 373
N.W.2d 826, 830-31 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (calculating breach of warranty damages based
on minority "out-of-pocket" rule, which measures damages by the difference between what
the defrauded person paid and what she received; in this case, because the purchaser
eventually sold the horse for fifty dollars less than what she initially paid, the court
awarded her only fifty dollars).
121 Kropp, supra note 15, at 198; see also Alpert. 643 F. Stipp. at 1420 (awarding plaintiff
$25,000 in consequential damages for expenses reasonably incurred in transportation,
care, custody, and insurance of the horse).
122 SHELDON 8: CARTER, supra note 24, at 382; see U.C.C. §§ 2-701-725.
123 U.C.C. § 1-102(2).
124 See id.
125 See id.; FERSH -EMAN, supra note 10, at 41.
126 See U.C.C. § 1-102(2); SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 24, at 384.
127 See Sti Ea.noN 8: CARTER, supra note 17, at 31.
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than the U.C.C. 128 Moreover, novice horse purchasers may find them-
selves in situations in which the U.C.C. will not protect them, but
CPAs will. 129
H. CONSUMER PROTECTION ACTS AND THEIR
APPLICATION TO EQUINE SALES
A. General Application of Consumer Protection Acts to Equine Sales
Every state has enacted at least one statute to protect consumers
from deception and abuse in the marketplace.'" State legislatures
have patterned many of these statutes, applicable to most consumer
transactions, including equine sales, after section 5(a) (1) of the Fed-
eral Trade Commission Act ("FTCA"), which prohibits unfair or de-
ceptive acts or practices."' This Note refers to these state statutes col-
lectively as Consumer Protection Acts ("CPAs").
CPAs, like the FTCA, limit the caveat emptor doctrine by provid-
ing flexible and practical state and private remedies for consumers
whom sellers deceive or abuse.'" Serious consumer abuses of almost
any form are likely constitute CPA violations because legislatures have
passed these statutes to remedy marketplace imbalances, thereby pro-
tecting the public.'" CPAs also protect the public by creating strict.
penalties against deceptive sellers, such as payment of attorney's fees
and punitive, treble, or minimum damage awards for prevailing con-
sumers.'" In addition, CPAs protect sellers to some degree, as many
states require that a consumer planning to file a CPA cause of action
send notice or a demand letter to the seller, providing the seller an
opportunity to remedy the situation out of court.'" Legislatures and
courts generally read CPAs broadly and flexibly, often prohibiting un-
122 See infra notes 267-313 and accompanying text for a discussion of how CPAs pro-
vide better remedies for unsophisticated horse purchasers than the U.C.C.
129 See infra notes 303-313 and accompanying text for a discussion of when CPAs pro-
tect purchasers and the U.C.C. does not.
1 " Sit u.noN & CARTER, supra note 17, at 31.
"I Id. at 31; see 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1) (2000).
132 SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 17, at 31; sec 15 U.S.C. § 45 (a) (1).
133 StnitmoN & CARTER, supra note 17, at 31; see, e.g.. Fancher v. &HUAI, 580 A.2d 51,
53 (Vt. 1990) ("The purpose of the Vermont Consumer Fraud Act is to protect the public
and is remedial in nature.").
194 SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 17, at 31.
1" Id. at 391. Sellers are also protected by a relatively short statute of limitations period
of one or two years, which runs from the time the purchaser knows or should know of the
violation. SIIEt.uoN & CARTER, supra note 24, at 385.
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fair and deceptive practices generally rather than specifically prohibit-
ing enumerated practices; consequently, CPAs often provide a very
useful cause of action in equine sales disputes. 135
Another benefit of CPA claims in equine sales is that they are not
contract claims, so "as is" clauses, remedy limitations, disclaimers of
warranties, failure to inspect horses prior to purchase, and other con-
tract defenses do not prevent recovery. 137 Courts will even find an
equine sales contract that violates the Statute of Frauds violative of a
CPA if the deceptive practices do not relate to the contract itself 138
For example, in 1987, in McClure v. Duggan, the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Texas upheld such a claim.'" In
McClure, the plaintiff claimed that he orally agreed to buy the defen-
dant's horse for $600,000, but then decided not to buy the horse
based on the defendant's statement that it would not pass the veteri-
nary inspection."° The plaintiff later learned that the defendant had
sold the horse to a different purchaser and that the horse had won
$175,000 in a race.l" 1 The plaintiff sued on several claims, including
breach of contract and violation of the state's CPA, the Texas Decep-
tive Trade Practices Act. 142 The court refused to acknowledge the exis-
tence of a contract because the alleged agreement violated the Statute
of Frauds. 143 The court found, however, that the defendant's misrep-
resentation that the horse would not pass the veterinary . inspection
was separate from the underlying contract.'" Therefore, the court
refused to grant the defendant summary judgment on the CPA claim,
concluding that the Statute of Frauds did not insulate him from CPA
liability for his alleged fraudulent misrepresentations." 5
Deceptive acts such as the misrepresentation and fraud in
McClure are examples of how unsatisfied horse purchasers can prove
' 35 See SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 17, at 31. For example, Washington's CPA sim-
ply provides: "Unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in
the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared unlawful." WASH. REV. CODE
§ 19.86.020 (1999).
132 See SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 24, at 384.
138 SeeS11 ELDON & CARTER, supra note 17, at 124.
139 674 F. Supp. 211, 224 (N.D. Tex. 1987).
14° Id. at 214.
141 Id. at 215.
142 Id. at 213-14; see TEX, Bus. & Cott. CODE ANN. § 17 (Vernon 2002).
143 McClure. 674 F. Supp. at 219.
144
 Id. at 224.
143 Id.
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CPA violations."6 Sellers often violate CPAs if they mislead consumers
in any way and at any point during a sales transaction."' In determin-
ing whether a seller misled a consumer, some courts consider the con-
sumer's level of sophistication and will provide more relief for novice
purchasers than for experienced purchasers. 149 Frequently, the con-
sumer need not show knowledge, intent, or even actual reliance to
prove a deceptive act. 149 In addition, courts often consider failure to
disclose just as deceptive as actual misrepresentation. 159
Although CPAs may broadly prohibit deceptive practices in trade
or commerce, they occasionally limit the scope of private actions or
remedies by narrowly defining terms such as "consumer," "supplier,"
"consumer transaction," "sale," or "goods and services." 151 Conse-
quently, the applicability of CPAs in equine sales often depends on a
court's interpretation of such terms. 152 For example, courts may find
that isolated sales by non-merchants do not fall within a CPA's
definition of trade or commerce." Also, a CPA itself often does not
contain a definition of "goods."'" In such cases, courts frequently re-
fer to definitions in the U.C.C. for clarity.' 59
Many states characterize living property like horses as "goods"
within the definition of the CPA. 196 In Texas, horses are tangible chat-
tels and therefore subject. to the state's CPA, which defines goods as
tangible chattel or real property purchased or leased for use. 157 Simi-
larly, the Supreme Court of Vermont has determined that the Ver-
146 Sec id.; see also infra notes 160-242 and accompanying text for a discussion of these
violations.
147 Stivi.noN & CARTER, Slip/ note 17, at 34.
148 See id. For example, in 1981, in Mush/ u Henthiclt, the Kansas Court of Appeals con-
sidered the level of sophistication of the parties involved to determine whether there was a
CPA violation. See 627 P.2d 367, 371 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981). The court concluded that both
parties were experienced in the pig farming industry; therefore, the purchaser was on
equal bargaining ground with the seller, and the plaintiff could not establish a deceptive
practice or unconscionable act under the Kansas Consumer Protection Act. See id.
149 Sec infra notes 184-201 and accompanying text.
150 See infra notes 202-212 and accompanying text.
15 ' Sii13,110N & CARTER, supra note 17. at 37.
15'` 	 id.
155 Id. at 39. The New Mexico Unfair Practices Act, for example, requires that the de-
ceptive practice occur in the defendant's regular course of trade or commerce; therefore,
the Act does not apply to isolated occurrences. In re Klein, 39 B.R. 20, 22 (Bankr D. N.M.
1984).
154 SIIELDON & CARTER, supra note 17. at 39.
155 Id.
156 Id,
157 Sec Ttx. Bus. & Cont. Coot: ANN. § 17.45(1) (Vernon 2002); Scholtz v. Sigel, 601
SAV.2d 516, 519 (Tex. App. 1980).
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mont Consumer Fraud Act covers horses under its definition of
"goods.'158
 Kentucky's CPA, however, does not define consumer goods
to include Thoroughbred horses; consequently, no private cause of
action exists for a dissatisfied Thoroughbred purchaser because the
CPA requires that goods be for personal, family, or household pur-
poses. 159
B. Violations of Consumer Protection Acts in Equine Sales Transactions and
Remedies for Horse Purchasers
Dissatisfied horse purchasers can argue two different types of
CPA violations—automatic violations and violations because the prac-
tice is generally unfair or deceptive. 160
 A violation is automatic if the
CPA specifically prohibits the practice at issite. 161 Such a claim can eas-
ily procure relief because the court does not have to consider whether
deception or unfairness occurred. 162
 For example, some courts find
that a breach of warranty under the U.C.C. automatically violates a
state's CPA; in these states, if horse purchasers can prove breach of
express or implied warranty, they also can satisfy a CPA claim without.
demonstrating a deceptive or unfair practice. 163 Some common-law
torts, such as fraud, also are automatic CPA violations. 164
 For example,
in McClure, the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Texas implicitly concluded that the defendant was not entitled to
summary judgment on the plaintiff's CPA claim because the plaintiff
sufficiently plead a common-law tort of fraud. 165
Practices that do not violate a specific, CPA-enumerated prohibi-
tion, however, are not automatic violations. 166
 Yet, a horse purchaser
166 See VT, STAT. ANN. tit. 9 § 2451(b) (1985); Faneher; 580 A.2d at 53.
166 See KY, REV, STAT. ANN. § 367.220 (Michie 2002); Cohen v. North Ridge Farms, Inc.,
712 F. Stipp. 1265, 1272 (E.D. Ky. 1989). It is possible a court in Kentucky could limit the
holding in Cohen to apply only to Thoroughbred horses, thereby finding a violation of the
state CPA for an equine sales transaction involving a horse other than a Thoroughbred;
however, the court's failure to explain why a Thoroughbred horse in particular was not a
consumer good indicates that courts in Kentucky would be unsympathetic toward pur-
chasers of any horse breed. See 712 F. Stipp. at 1272. Moreover, after Cohen, there appear to
be no other cases involving a CPA claim for an equine sales transaction, indicating that
such a claim likely would prove unsuccessful. See id.
leo See SHELDON & CARTER, Minn 1101.e 17, at 83.
161 Id.
162 id.
163 See id. at 88.
164 See id. at 91.
166 See 674 F. Stipp. at 223.
166
 SHELDON CARTER, supra note 17, at 91.
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still can prove a CPA violation by demonstrating a deceptive or unfair
practice. 167 Some CPAs only apply to deceptive practices, whereas oth-
ers apply to both deceptive and unfair practices. 168 To see how unfair
or deceptive practice claims work under CPAs, it is important. first to
understand the standards of deception, unfairness, and unconscion-
ability, and then to look at the remedies available to deceived horse
purchasers. 169
1. The Standard of Deception
Instead of looking at precedent to determine whether a practice
is deceptive, courts look at whether the sales activity or representation
at issue could mislead or deceive even a handful of unsophisticated
consumers.'" For example, in 1084, in Appleby v. Hendrix, the Texas
Court of Appeals determined that the defendant's advertisement in a
horse breeders' magazine stating that "these horses need a home
where their excellent bloodlines can be effectively used" represented
that the horse the plaintiff ultimately purchased was a fertile stud."'
In reality, the stallion lacked the ability to impregnate the plaintiffs
mares.'" Thus, the court implicitly determined there could be a CPA
violation because the defendant's advertisement had the tendency to
mislead purchasers such as the plaintiff.'"
One straightforward way to show the potential deceptiveness of a
practice involves demonstrating that the defendant seller actually de-
ce ived the plaintiff."4 For example, in 2002, in Back Bay Farm, LLC v.
Collucia, the United States District Court for the District of Massachu-
setts implicitly found that the plaintiff might be able to prove a viola-
tion of the state CPA by showing that the defendant had knowingly
197 See id.; sec, e.g., Scholtz, 601 S.W.2d at 519 (upholding the trial court's finding of de-
ceptive practices, and therefore a CPA violation, based on the defendants' misrepresenta-
tions that the horse was good for show purposes and the plaintiff's reliance on the defen-
dants' judgment).
168 See SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 17, at 94.
169 See infra notes 170-261 and accompanying text for a discussion of these standards
and remedies.
170 See, e.g., Travis v. Washington Horse Breeders Ass'n, 759 P.2d 418, 423 (Wash. 1988)
(finding a CPA violation because the seller's advertisements and statements were likely to
mislead other purchasers).
171 See 673 S.W.2d 295, 298 (Tex. App. 1984).
172 See id. at 297.
17S See id. at 298-99.
171
 Sec Back Bay Faint, LLC v. Collucio, 230 F. Stapp. 2d 176. 181 (D. Mass. 2002).
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used false and deceitful tactics when selling the plaintiff a horse. 175
The court determined that the plaintiff might be able to establish that
the defendant's misrepresentation of the horse's suitability for an av-
erage rider actually deceived the plaintiff r 79 The court found that the
misrepresentations, in conjunction with the defendant's agreement
and subsequent refusal to return the plaintiffs purchase price of
$60,000, could satisfy the CPA's definition of unfair acts and prac-
tices. 177
The standard of deception under most CPAs, however, does not
require actual deception, and instead only requires that a practice
have the capacity or tendency to deceive potential purchasers." 9 Ac-
cordingly, courts have found practices deceptive under CPAs despite
the truthfulness of statements, the subsequent clarification of state-
ments, and the existence of contract defenses such as warranty dis-
claitners. 179 Moreover, courts characterize silence or failure to disclose
a material fact as deceptive, even when the seller's actual representa-
tions did not mislead the purchaser. 1 " A seller's state of mind is un-
important—courts find a practice deceptive if it has a tendency to
mislead unsophisticated and vulnerable consumers. 181 Based on Min-
nesota's CPA, for example, courts enjoin any fraud or misrepresenta-
tion committed with the intent that others rely on it in connection
with the sale of any goods—including horses—even if the fraud or
misrepresentation did not in fact mislead, deceive, or damage any
person)92 In addition, most CPAs prohibit the defense that the entire
industry engages in the challenged practice or that the practice is cus-
tomary business conduct)"
Moreover, CPAs typically do not require proof of intent to de-
ceive)84 Courts in the State of Washington have determined that a
purchaser of a defective horse need not show that the seller intended
"a See id. In Back Bay, the court considered the defendant's motion to dismiss for fail-
ure to state a claim, lack of venue, and lack of personal jurisdiction. Id. at 179. Thus, the
court upheld the plaintiff s claim only to the extent that she adequately pled a violation of
the Massachusetts CPA, chapter 93A, to withstand a motion to dismiss. Sec
176 Sec id.
177 Sec id. at 179, 181.
"a SHELDON & CARTER. supra note 17. at 93.
og Id. at 93-94.
le° Id. at 94.
181 Id.
182 See MINN. STAT. § 325F.69 (1995); Yost v. Millhouse, 373 N.W.2d 826, 831 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1985).
183 SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 17, at 112.
184 Sec id. at 109.
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to deceive the purchaser.' 85 Similar to the discussion above regarding
actual deception,m6 a purchaser need only show that the alleged act.
had the capacity to deceive a substantial portion of the public.' 87 This
focus on a capacity to deceive rather than intent to deceive helps de-
ter future deceptive conduct, thereby preventing harm to other pur-
chasers. 188 Some CPAs, however, require that the seller intended for
the horse purchaser to rely on the deceptive act or statement. 189 The
few states that require reliance generally apply the requirement
broadly; thus, in cases in which a pattern of misrepresentations oc-
curs, a court likely would find such a practice deceptive.' 90 For exam-
ple, in 1992, in Cronin v. Bacon, the Texas Court of Appeals upheld the
jury's finding that the defendant farm had engaged in deceptive prac-
tices by representing on several occasions that the farm had bred the
plaintiff's mare to a particularly well-known stallion, when in fact the
farm had bred the mare to a lesser-known stallion. 191
Like intent to deceive, most CPAs do not require that sellers
know that their statements are false. 192 For example, in 1985, in Yost v.
Millhouse, the Minnesota Court of Appeals found the defendant horse
seller liable even though he did not know his statements were false.' 93
In Yost, the plaintiff purchased the defendant's yearling for $400, rely-
ing on the defendant's repeated statements that the horse was regis-
tered with the American Quarter Horse Association, when, in fact,
unknown to the defendant, the horse was actually not registered.'"
Despite lack of evidence that the defendant had intended to deceive
the plaintiff, the court. found the defendant. liable for misrepresenta-
tion—which constituted an automatic violation of the CPA—because
he continuously represented that he knew that the horse was regis-
leo See, e.g., Davis. 759 P.2d at 923 ("To establish that there was an unfair or deceptive
act, (a] plaintiff need not show that the act in question was intended to deceive. but that the
alleged act had the capacity to deceive a substantial portion of the public." (citing Hang-
man Ridge Training Stables, Inc. v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 719 P.2d 531 (Wash. 1986)).
186 Sec supra note 178 and accompanying text.
187 See Sit ta.noNt & CARTER, supra note 17, at 113.
188 See Hangman, 719 P.2d at 535 ("The purpose of the capacity-to•deceive test is to de-
ter deceptive conduct before injury occurs.").
188 See SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 17, at 110. Examples of such states include
Delaware. Illinois, and Oregon. Id. 1111.25-.26,
190 Scc id.
"II Sec 837 S.W.2d 265, 268 (Tex. App. 1992).
192 See SIIELDON & CARTER, supra note 17, at 110.
198 Sec 373 N.W.2d at 830.
194 Sec id. at 828, 829, 830.
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tered without actually having such knowledge. 05
 Even courts that re-
quire knowledge on the part of the seller often apply the requirement
broadly; thus, courts will characterize a seller's definitive statement
made without knowledge, such as the seller's in Yost, as a knowing,
false statement. 1 36
Reliance on a seller's misrepresentation is another factor courts
consider in a CPA violation claim. 07
 Some courts require that a pur-
chaser demonstrate actual reliance on the seller's misrepresentation,
whereas other courts merely consider whether a reasonable person
would have relied on the misrepresentafion. 198
 For example, in 1980,
in Schultz v. Sigel, the Texas Court of Appeals implicitly concluded that
the trial court could have found that the plaintiff relied on the defen-
dants' misrepresentation that the horse she purchased from them was
good for show purposes.'" The sellers knew the horse had poor bone
structure and was not suitable for showing yet, they induced the
plaintiff to purchase the horse by representing that the horse was of a
higher quality than it actually was. 200
 The court implicitly concluded
that the purchaser's reliance on the sellers' misrepresentations could
constitute a violation of the CPA. 2°1
A seller can also deceive a horse purchaser by failing to disclose
material facts about a horse." 2
 Some CPAs expressly prohibit a seller's
failure to disclose such facts, whereas other states find a CPA violation
based on the deceptiveness of such a failure. 203 For example, in 1990,
in Fancher v. Benson, the Supreme Court of Vermont found that the
jury could have concluded that the seller's intentional delay in dis-
closing the horse's heart defect to the purchaser violated the state's
CPA because the delay was deceptive. 204 Similarly, some courts will
find a CPA violation when a seller should have learned of a defect but
did not and therefore failed to disclose the defect to the purchaser. 205
For example, in 1988, in Travis v. Washington Horse Breeders Ass'n, the
195 See id. at 829-30.
196 See id. at 829, 830; SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 17, at 111.
197 SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 17, at 116-17.
198 See id.
199 601 S.W.2d at 518.
2°9 Id. at 518, 519.
201 See id. at 519.
202 See SIIELDON & CARTER, supra note 17, at 118.
203 See id.
2°4
 580 A.2d at 54-55. Interestingly, the jury returned verdicts in favor of the defen-
dant on the breach of express and implied warranty claims. See id. at 54 n.2.
205 SIIEI.DON & CARTER, supra note 17, at 122-23.
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Supreme Court of Washington implicitly concluded that, because the
auction house never examined sale horses even though examinations
were customary in the auction industry, the seller should have known
of the colt's defect by examining it before the sale and should have
disclosed the information to the purchaser. 2°6 The court concluded
that the failure to routinely inspect horses prior to their sale, while
making representations about their ability to race, sufficiently proved
that those acts had the capacity to deceive a substantial portion of the
public. 207
Although some courts find CPA violations when sellers fail to dis-
close unknown but discoverable defects, other courts do not require
sellers to disclose information they do not or should not have
known. 2" For example, in 1989, in Cohen v. North Ridge Farms, Inc., the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky con-
cluded that the seller had no duty to discover and disclose any defects
in the horse because the horse was sold "as is;" therefore, the seller's
failure to disclose the horse's respiratory problems was not a misrep-
resentation. 209 Similarly, in 2002, in Hurwitz v. Strain, the Appeals
Court of Massachusetts found the defendant not liable under the
state's CPA when a beginner rider died after being thrown from her
horse several clays after purchasing it from the defendant. 21 ° Although
the rider purchased the horse based on the defendant's assurances of
the horse's mild disposition and suitability for a novice rider, the
court concluded that the plaintiff did not establish that at the time of
the sale the defendant knew of the horse's unsuitability for a begin-
ning rider. 211 Consequently, the court determined that no violation of
the CPA existed. 212
2. The Standards of Unfairness and Unconscionability
Courts consider unfairness to be a broader concept than decep-
tion. 2" Consequently, if a CPA prohibits unfair practices, and not just
deceptive practices, courts generally find most state statutory viola-
208 See 759 P.2(1 at 423.
207 Sec id.
248 SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 17, at 123.
208 See 712 F. Stipp. at 1272.
21° See No. 00•P-868. 2002 WL 1924835, at *1 (Mass. App. Ct. Aug. 19. 2002).
211 See id. at *1, 2.
212 Sec id. at *2.
218 SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 17, at 94.
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Lions to be per se unfair. 2 " In determining unfairness, courts consider
whether a practice is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous,
unconscionable, offends public policy, or causes substantial injury to
constimers. 215
 In equine sales transactions, courts commonly consider
unconscionability issues and public policy concerns when determin-
ing the possible unfairness of a practice. 21 °
Many courts characterize a seller's taking unfair advantage of a
purchaser's inexperience or capacity as unconscionable. 217
 Courts
frequently apply a particularly high standard for unconscionability in
equine sales transactions, assuming that most participants in such
transactions have significant experience in the equine industry. 2 " Of-
ten, a court hesitates in striking seemingly unfair contractual clauses
unless they are clearly unconscionable on their face or violative of
public policy. 219
 For example, in Cohen, the plaintiff argued that his
$575,000 purchase of a Thoroughbred yearling, which he later dis-
covered had respiratory problems making the horse unable to race,
was unconscionable for failure of consideration. 22° In refusing to up-
hold the claim, the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Kentucky emphasized that the plaintiff had significant experi-
ence in the horse business and had gotten exactly what he bargained
for: a yearling "as
Some courts, however, find a practice unconscionable if a gross
disparity exists between the value received and the consideration
paid. 222
 For example, in 1990, in Teague v. Bandy, the Texas Court of
Appeals found a CPA violation because the plaintiffs purchased an
214
 Id. at 89.
215 Id. at 94.
215 See, e.g., Cohen, 712 F. Stipp. at 1270 (discussing unconscionability issues such as
failure of consideration); Travis, 759 P.2d at 423 (discussing public policy concerns).
217
 SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 17, at 94.
218
 See Miller, supra note 12, at 530-31.
219
 See id. at 530.
220 See 712 F. Stipp. at 1270.
"1 See id. at 1270, 1272. The court further stated, The only way there could be a fail-
ure of consideration would be if plaintiff had received (1) nothing, (2) a dead yearling, or
(3) a live yearling different from the one on which he bid." Id. at 1270; see also Schweizer v.
Dekalb Swine Breeders, Inc., 954 F. Stipp. 1495, 1503 (D. Kan. 1997) (concluding that
plaintiffs, who purchased diseased pigs from the defendant, could not receive relief under
the Kansas CPA because the plaintiffs did not demonstrate that the defendant enjoyed an
unfair advantage over them, the plaintiffs had experience in the hog production business,
and neither plaintiff had identified anything in the sales contracts as 'confusing. mislead-
ing or deceptive;" consequently, the transaction was not unconscionable).
222 Sec SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 17, at 94; infra notes 223-224 and accompany-
ing text.
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interest in a cow's future calves for $75,000 but received nothing of
value in return for their payment and later learned that the cow could
not produce embryos. 223 The court found that the purchase was un-
conscionable because a gross disparity existed between what had been
delivered—$75,000—and what had been received—a barren cow. 224
Courts may be more willing to consider a practice unfair if the
horse purchaser is new to the equine industry and lacks experience in
equine sales transactions or if the practice has the capacity to deceive
a substantial portion of the public. 225 For example, some CPAs require
that the practice affect the public interest for a violation to occur. 226
Courts hesitate to find that private transactions between a seller and
purchaser have the capacity to deceive a large number of people;
therefore, in states with a public interest requirement, a purchaser
will find it difficult to obtain relief under the state's CPA. 227 Under
South Carolina's Unfair Trade Practices Act, courts require that an
unfair or deceptive act or practice have an impact upon the public
interest to be actionable; a mere breach of contract will not constitute
a violation of the statute. 228 For example, in 1993, in Perry v. Green, the
South Carolina Court of Appeals found no such impact on the public
interest.229 In Perry, the defendant sold the plaintiff a registered Ara-
bian mare for breeding purposes. 2" The purchase contract required
the defendant to transfer the horse's registration papers when he re-
ceived the last payment. 231 He refused, however, and then actively
thwarted the plaintiffs attempts to prove full payment and ownership
to the Arabian Horse Registry of America, thereby significantly de-
creasing the value of the horse and its future offspring. 232 The court
found for the plaintiff on her breach of contract claim, but refused to
find a violation of the state's CPA because it was unlikely the seller
would repeat such conduct to the point where it negatively affected
the public interes1.299
229 793 S.W.2d 50,53 (Tex. App. 1990).
224 See id. at 54.
229 See, e.g., Rovis, 759 P.2d at 423 (finding a CPA violation because the practice had
the capacity to deceive the public).
226 See id.; Perry v. Green, 437 S.E.2d 150,154 (S.C. Ct. App. 1993).
227 See SuripoN It: CARTER, supra note 17, at 388.
226 See S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5 (Law. Co-op. 1985); Perry, 437 S.E.2d at 159.
229 See 437 S.E.2d at 154.
2" Id. at 151.
231 Id.
232 Id,
233 Id. at 153-54.
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Unlike private transactions between two parties, auctions are par-
ticularly susceptible to unfairness claims because they affect the pub-
lic on a broader scale. 234 Consequently, courts often scrutinize auction
sales more closely than private transactions. 235 For example, in Travis,
the Supreme Court of Washington determined whether the seller's
deceptive acts affected the public interest by considering whether
repetition of the practice could potentially occur. 236 The court con-
cluded that other people could suffer injuries similar to the plaintiff's
because the auction house's practices were longstanding and there-
fore unlikely to change. 237 The court harbored particular concern
about the effect that such practices would have on new purchasers
inexperienced with both horse auctions and the equine industry gen-
erally. 238
Disclaimers of warranties may also raise public policy or uncon-
scionability concerns. 239
 If such disclaimers are in large, bold type in a
printed auction catalog or are legible and easy to read in a purchase
contract, courts have enforced the disclaimers. 240 Some courts, how-
ever, have found it unreasonable to allow disclaimers of express war-
ranties because they are inherently inconsistent with the idea of an
express warranty. 241 Therefore, in Travis, the court implicitly con-
cluded that disclaimers of express warranties contravened public pal-
icy.242
234 See Miller, supra note 12, at 534-35.
233 Id. at 535.
236 See 759 P.2d at 423.
237
 See id.
238 See id. Indeed, the lower court's opinion emphasized that the plaintiff was a relative
newcomer to the sport of horse racing. See Travis v. Washington Horse Breeders Ass'n, 734
P.2d 956,958 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987). The court stated, "it seems incredible that an exami-
nation was not uniformly given to horses rated as the best before they were placed in the
auction for sale. [The plaintiff] believed the horse was sound and healthy; tinder these
circumstances, any prospective consumer reasonably could have had the same understand-
ing? Id. at 959.
2!B
	 supra note 12, at 529.
24° See Schweizer 954 F. Stipp. at 1499-1500; Cohen, 712 F. Stipp. at 1267-68; Travis, 759
P.2d at 421-22.
241 See,	 Travis, 759 P.2d at 422 ("If the fact finder determines that a seller's statement cre-
ated an express warranty, words purportedly disclaiming that warranty will have no effect, for the
disclaiming language is inherently inconsistent." (citing Ilium: & SUMMERS, UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE 430 (2d ed. 1980)).
242 See id. at 423.
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3. Remedies for Horse Purchasers with Valid CPA Claims
Once a court determines that a horse seller's actions were decep-
tive or unfair and therefore constitute a CPA violation, a purchaser
can obtain various remedies. 243 These remedies vary from state to
state, but most horse purchasers seek damages. 244 Courts determine
damages in a number of ways depending on the CPA. 245 Out-of-pocket.
damages are calculated as the difference between the amount the
purchaser paid for the horse and the horse's actual value. 24° Loss-of-
bargain damages, which are larger than out-of-pocket damages, are
calculated as the difference between what the purchaser expected the
horse to be worth and what the horse actually is worth. 247 In addition,
most CPAs also allow purchasers to receive proximate damages for
additional costs related to the CPA violation. 248 Moreover, some CPAs
award purchasers multiple damages, such as treble damages, to deter
future seller misconduct. and award the purchaser for pursuing a
claim.219 Typically courts interpreting these statutes award multiple
damages only in cases in which a plaintiff sustains actual damages and
a seller acted willfully or in bad faith. 25°
Some states also allow punitive damages for CPA claims. 251 Like
multiple damage awards, courts typically award punitive damages in
cases in which the seller acted maliciously, willfully, or with reckless
indifference to the interests of others. 252 For example, the Supreme
Court of Vermont in Fan cher upheld a jury award of punitive damages
based on the seller's intentional delay in disclosing the horse's heart
defect to the purchaser, which the court considered deceptive and
242 See SU ELDON & CAR•R, supra note 17, at 415-32.
244 See. e.g., Cronin, 837 S.W.2d at 267 (horse purchaser sought damages). Some CPAs,
such as those of Ohio and Texas, allow rescission as a remedy. SuELnoN Sc CARTER, supra
note 17, at 441-42.
242 SI1ELDON & CARTER, supra note 17, at 416.
246 See id.; see. e.g., Yost, 373 N.W.2d at 830-31 (awarding the plaintiff only fifty dollars
because site eventually sold the horse for fifty dollars less than what she initially paid).
247 SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 17, at 416; see, e.g., Cronin, 837 S.W.2d at 269-70
(awarding damages based on the difference in value between a prospective foal sired by
the stallion to whom the purchaser believed his mare was being bred and the value of a
prospective foal sired by the stallion to whom the purchaser's mare actually was bred).
248 SIIELDON & CARTER, supra note 17, at 418.
249 Id. at 423.
2" See id. at 424.
221 See id. at 428.
222 See id. at 429; see. e.g.. Thst. 373 N.W.2t1 at 832 (concluding that the purchaser was
not entitled to punitive damages because the seller did not show a willful indifference to
her rights by mistakenly misrepresenting that the horse was not registered).
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therefore a violation of Vermont's CPA.253
 The court found sufficient
evidence of malice, which the court defined as the use of sharp selling
tactics, to support the jury award of punitive damages. 254 According to
the court, the jury could find such sharp selling tactics based on the
following facts: the seller intentionally delayed disclosure, lied to the
plaintiff about the medical report's contents, and deceived the plain-
tiff's agent into not immediately notifying the plaintiff of the medical
report's contents. 255
Sonic states occasionally allow damages based on mental anguish;
however, most require a showing of physical harm or a high degree of
mental pain and distress before doing so. 256
 For example, in Cronin,
the Texas jury awarded $20,000 in damages to the plaintiff for mental
anguish under the CPA, based on his extreme anger at the defendant
for breeding the plaintiff's mare to one stallion while representing
that she had been bred to another. 257
 The Texas Court of Appeals
overruled the jury award because the plaintiff's feelings of anger and
frustration were not sufficient to recover mental anguish damages.258
Finally, most CPAs allow a successful plaintiff to recover attorney's
fees. 259
 For example, the court in Cronin upheld the trial court's award
of attorney's fees because the Texas CPA allowed for reasonable and
necessary attorney's fees. 259
 Similarly, the Supreme Court of Washing-
ton in Travis upheld payment of attorney's fees for the CPA claim, but
it specifically limited the award to only those services related to the
CPA cause of action. 261
III. How CPA CLAIMS PROVIDE A BETTER AVENUE OF REDRESS
FOR UNSOPHISTICATED HORSE PURCHASERS
THAN U.C.C. CLAIMS
Most people, including many judges, believe that horse owners
are wealthy businesspeople with experience in the equine industry. 262
255
 See 580 A.2d at 54-55.
254 See id. at 55.
255
 See id. at 54-55.
256 SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 17, at 420-21.
57 837 S.W.2d at 268,269.
258
 See id. at 269.
259 SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 24, at 383.
26U See 837 S.W.2d at 268.
261 See 759 P.2d at 425.
262
 See, e.g., Cohen v. North Ridge Farms, Inc., 712 F. Stipp. 1265,1272 (E.D. Ky. 1989)
(the court's view that Thoroughbred horses are not consumer goods indicates that the
court believes that most horse purchasers are not average consumers); Miller, supra note
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A large number of horse purchasers, however, are first-time purchas-
ers, like the Millers in the hypothetical above, 263 and therefore are
unfamiliar with the equine industry, 204 Unlike knowledgeable busi-
nesspeople, these novices are particularly susceptible to unfair and
deceptive sales practices throughout an equine sales transaction and
deserve protection t inder state law. 265 Both the U.C.C. and CPAs pro-
vide such protection. 260 CPAs, however, provide more protection to
deceived, unsophisticated horse purchasers because they have
broader, more flexible standards that apply on a case by case basis. 267
Obtaining relief under CPAs can be easier than under the
U.C.C.268 Relief under either type of statute often depends on the dif-
ferent policies and purposes of the statutes. 269 The main purpose of
the U.C.C. is to protect the relationship between purchasers and sell-
ers, thereby encouraging freedom of con tract. 27° Thus, in equine sales
disputes, courts typically base their determination of a U.C.C. claim
solely on the terms of the contract and assume that both parties were
on equal fooling during negotiations. 27 i These assumptions are fair if
both parties are sophisticated and experienced in the equine industry
and are in equal bargaining positions. 272 The same assumptions, how-
ever, can prevent unsophisticated horse purchasers, who often know
12, at 533 ("The author suspects that there are very few inexperienced consumers in the
horse business.").
262 See Man note 6 and accompanying text to review the hypothetical.
264 SeeTilton, supra note 1, at 541.
260 See id. Experienced and sophisticated horse purchasers arguably do not require
protection because they are knowledgeable of the equine industry and therefore more
likely to be on equal bargaining ground with the seller. See, e.g., Musa v. Hendrich, 627
P.2d 367, 371 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981) (concluding that because both parties were experi-
enced in the pig farming industry, the purchaser and seller were on equal bargaining
ground; therefore, the plaintiff could not establish a deceptive practice or unconscionable
act under the Kansas Consumer Protection Act).
266 See supra notes 24-261 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of the pro-
tections the U.C.C. and CPAs provide.
267 SeeU .G.C. § 1-102 (2000); SHELDON & CAR'EER, supra note 17, at 31.
268 SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 17, at 31.
262 See supra notes 123-126, 132-136 and accompanying text for a discussion of U.C.C.
and CPA policies and purposes.
270 See SHELDON & CAWEER, supra note 24. at 52.
2" Sec. e.g.. Cohen. '712 E. Stipp. at 1272 (concluding that the contract was valid because
the plaintiff was a man experienced in the horse business, who willingly purchased a year-
ling as is" with no express or implied warranties).
272 See. e.g., id.: Musil, 627 P.2d at 371 (concluding that the contract was fair because
both parties were experienced in the pig farming industry; therefore, the purchaser was
on equal bargaining ground with the seller).
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far less about the equine industry than the seller, from receiving re-
lief.275
The purpose of CPAs, unlike the contract-based goals of the
U.C.C., is to prevent deception and abuses against consumers in the
marketplace.274
 Courts considering a CPA claim look for whether the
practice at issue had a tendency to mislead even the smallest group of
unsophisticated consumers.275
 CPAs, therefore, generally protect con-
sumers, whereas the U.C.C. protects commercial transactions and
contracts. 276
 In equine sales disputes, courts usually favor freedom of
contract to protecting horse purchasers; thus, U.C.C. claims, which
are always contract-specific, often fail. 277
 Courts can be more sympa-
thetic, however, to horse purchasers who raise CPA claims based on
deceptive and unfair practices. 278
 Therefore, unsophisticated horse
purchasers are more likely to obtain relief under a CPA claim than a
U.C.C. claim. 279
 Indeed, even sophisticated horse purchasers can re-
ceive relief under a CPA claim in many states, particularly if they can
show that the practice at issue had the capacity to deceive unsophisti-
cated purchasers. 28°
CPAs also protect unsophisticated horse purchasers more thor-
oughly than the U.C.C. by providing more extensive monetary reme-
dies. 28i Although both the U.C.C. and CPAs allow horse purchasers to
receive damages for breaches of warranty, CPAs also allow purchasers
to recover for the deceptive practice at issue. 282
 Moreover, most CPAs,
275 SCE FERSHTMAN, supra note 10, at 41.
274 See SH ELDON & CARTER, supra note 17, at 31.
276 See, e.g., Travis v. Washington Horse Breeders Ass'n, 759 P.2d 418, 423 (Wash. 1988)
(finding a CPA violation because the seller's advertisements and statements were likely to
mislead other purchasers).
276 See .C.C. § 1-102 (2000); SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 17, at 31.
277 See, e.g., McClure v. Duggan, 674 F. Stipp. 211, 219 (N.D. Tex. 1987) (concluding
implicitly that there was no valid U.C.C. claim because no contract existed).
278 See. e.g.. Faucher v. Benson. 580 A.2d 51, 54 & n.2, 55 (Vt. 1990) (upholding jury
finding that the seller's intentional delay in disclosing the horse's heart defect violated the
Vermont CPA, but noting that the jury failed to find for the plaintiff on her breach of war-
ranty claims).
278 See id.
280 See Travis, 759 P.2d at 423. When a sophisticated purchaser can demonstrate that a
seller's actions might affect unsophisticated purchasers, a CPA claim works to deter such
deceptive practices in the future. See id. Thus, to encourage deterrence, many CPAs also
protect sophisticated horse purchasers. Sec id.
251 See supra notes 243-261 and accompanying text for a discussion of these remedies.
252 See supra notes 119-122, 243-261 and accompanying text for a discussion of dam-
ages under the U.C.C. and CPAs.
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unlike the U.C.C., provide recovery of attorney's fees. 283 Conse-
quently, deceived horse purchasers can receive greater monetary
remedies under a successful CPA claim than a U.C.C. claim. 284
These greater CPA remedies exist to promote important public
policy concerns, unlike U.C.C. remedies, which exist to regulate
commercial relationships. 285 Requiring deceptive horse sellers to pay
attorney's fees encourages purchasers to bring lawsuits when they
could not otherwise afford litigation. 286 Enabling more lawsuits
against deceptive sellers deters sellers from continuing their deceptive
practices in the equine industry. 287 In addition, awarding attorney's
fees encourages sellers to settle quickly, thereby relieving courts of a
drain on resources. 288 Thus, awarding attorney's fees not only achieves
the goal of most CPAs by protecting horse purchasers from deception
and abuses, but also conserves precious judicial resources.289
Based on these policy considerations, deceived horse purchasers
also should obtain relief more easily tinder CPAs than under the
U.C.C. in cases in which they can prove the unconscionability of a
transaction. 29° Because the U.C.C. favors the contractual relationship
between purchaser and seller, courts considering a U.C.C. claim as-
sume that parties to an equine sales transaction are sophisticated and
willingly agreed to all the terms of the contract, even those that may
seem unfair. 291 In contrast, CPAs focus not on the contractual rela-
tionship, but instead on whether the practice at issue had the capacity
to deceive unsophisticated purchasers. 292 Even in private equine sales
289
	 & CARTER, SUPPO note 24, at 383.
254 See id.
286 See supra notes 123-126 and accompanying text for a discussion of U.C.C. policies.
286
	 SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 17, at 442.
2" See id. For example, in 1985, in Yost v. Millhouse. the Minnesota Court of Appeals fol-
lowed this deterrence theory by upholding a CPA-based award of attorney's fees, stating,
"(Ellie Consumer Fraud Act is designed to encourage persons to take action to stop the
fraudulent activity covered by the act, even though the amount actually lost may be small."
See 373 N.W.2d 826,832 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
289 See SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 17, at 442.
299
	 id.
290 See supra notes 213-242 and accompanying text for a discussion of unconscionabil-
ity claims under CPAs.
28t
	 Miller, supra note 12, at 530-31. For example, in Cohen, the court emphasized
that the plaintiff was a man experien ced in the horse business, who willingly purchased a
yearling "as is" with no express or implied warranties. See 712 F. Stipp. at 1272,
292 SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 17, at 93.
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transactions, courts often find a CPA violation if the practice has the
capacity to deceive other horse purchasers. 293
Another way CPAs provide more thorough protection for de-
ceived horse purchasers is their more flexible approach to reliance. 294
Reliance is both less flexible and more important to a successful claim
under the U.C.C. because, under the U.C.C., courts only look at the
two parties to the contract and their understanding of its con ten tS. 293
For example, the most important element of a breach of implied war-
ranty of fitness for a particular purpose claim under the U.C.C. is the
horse purchaser's reliance on the seller's judgment in recommending
the horse for that particular purpose. 298 Although some CPAs apply a
similar standard, many do not consider whether the purchaser actu-
ally relied on the seller's misrepresentation but instead only consider
whether a reasonable person would have relied on the misrepresenta-
tion.297 This view of reliance shifts the focus from the contractual rela-
tionship to the deceptive practices that could potentially injure pur-
chasers beyond the purchaser in the case at hand. 298 In the equine
industry, in which horse sellers usually have knowledge of the abilities
and health of their horses, sellers can and do easily take advantage of
new horse purchasers unfamiliar with industry practices. 299 Even if a
new purchaser in one instance does not rely on a deceptive act, allow-
ing that act to go unpunished encourages sellers to deceive other
purchasers.") Consequently, the broader, more flexible interpretation
of reliance under the CPA allows for greater deterrence of deceptive
practices than does the interpretation of reliance under the U.C.C.39 I
This flexibility of CPAs emphasizes perhaps the•most important
advantage of a CPA claim. 392 Unlike the U.C.C., which relies on con-
293 See. e.g., Travis, 759 P.2d at 423 (concluding the practice was deceptive and there-
fore violated the state CPA because it had the capacity to deceive other horse purchasers).
294 See supra notes 189-191 and accompanying text for a discussion of reliance under
CPAs.
295 See Miller, supra note 12, at 530, 587.
296 Cohan, supra note 12, at 679.
292 See SHELDON & CARTER, Supra note 17, at 116-17.
296 See id.
299 See, e.g., Scholtz v. Sigel, 601 S.W.2d 516, 518, 519 (Tex. App. 1980) (concluding the
sellers knew the horse had poor bone structure and was not suitable for showing, and
therefore took advantage of the purchaser by misrepresenting that the horse was of a
higher quality than it actually was).
30° Sec supra note 188 and accompanying text.
301 See SIIELDON & CARTER, supra note 17, at 117: supra note 188 and accompanying
text.
302 See SHELDON & CAR'ITR, supra note 24, at 384.
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tract principles, CPA claims rely on the broader concepts of deception
and unfairness. 503 Contract laws do not apply to CPA claims, so dis-
claimers or extinguishment of warranties, which prevent relief under
the U.C.C., do not prevent relief t inder a CPA. 304 For example, in the
hypothetical above, the Millers unwittingly disclaimed all warranties
by signing the contract, so they could not sue the seller for breach of
warranty under the U.C.C. 303 A court could determine, however, that
the seller's statement about Buttercup's impressive jumping abilities,
combined with his failure to disclose the pony's chronic lameness, was
deceptive and therefore violated the state's CPA. 306
Similarly, contract doctrines such as the Statute of Frauds, which
often bar U.C.C. claims, do not bar CPA claims. 307 Even the examina-
tion exception does not apply to CPA claims." 8 Knowledge of a cus-
tom such as a pre-purchase examination requires experience in the
equine industry that many newcomers lack. 303 Because the examina-
tion exception does not apply under CPAs, CPAs would protect new
purchasers more effectively than the U.C.C. in these situations. 3" For
example, in the hypothetical above, if the Millers had employed a vet-
erinarian prior to the purchase, they likely would have learned of Bitt
tercup's lameness. 3 " It is not equitable, however, to punish newcom-
ers to the equine industry while businesspeople such as the seller
actively withhold material information regarding the horse's health. 312
Therefore, CPAs protect horse purchasers from such inequities in the
equine industry by looking at the level of sophistication of any poten-
tial purchaser. 3"
This consideration of any potential purchaser's level of sophisti-
cation is yet another example of how deceived horse purchasers can
303 See id,
5414 See supra notes 91-92,100-114 and accompanying text for a discussion of disclaim-
ers and limitations of remedies under the U.C.C.
305 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
•	 306 See supra notes 170-212 and accompanying text for a discussion of the standard of
deception.
5°7 See supra notes 137-145 and accompanying text for a discussion of how contract
principles do not apply to CPA claims.
309 See supra notes 103-108 and accompanying text for a discussion of the examination
exception.
3°9 See Tilton, supra note 1, at 541.
S10 SeeSuELDON & CARTER, supra note 24, at 384; Tilton, supra note 1. at 591.
311 Sec supra note 6 and accompanying text.
312 See ELDON & CARTER, supra note 24, at 384; Tilton, supra note 1, at 541.
313 Sit 	 & CARTER, supra note 17, at 34.
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obtain superior relief under CPAs than the U.C.C." 4 Some states,
such as Kentucky, however, do not focus on the level of sophistication
of horse purchasers in CPA claims." 5
 Kentucky's CPA, which does not
apply to the purchase of Thoroughbred horses because they are not
considered goods for personal purposes, fails to protect deceived
horse purchasers from inequities in the equine industry. 516
 This view
of horse ownership places unsophisticated horse purchasers like the
Millers in the same category as the savvy owners of potential sweep-
stakes winners—professional businesspeople who should know better
than to agree to unfavorable contract terms. 517 The United States Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky's failure to apply Ken-
tucky's CPA to Thoroughbred sales in Cohen v. North Ridge Farms, Inc.
overlooks the general purpose of CPAs—protecting purchasers from
marketplace abuses." 8 Although the plaintiff in Cohen likely did not
deserve protection because he was experienced in the equine indus-
try, the court's interpretation of the CPA adversely affects unsophisti-
cated horse purchasers.319 If courts in Kentucky are particularly con-
cerned about sophisticated horse purchasers taking advantage of the
state's CPA, the courts could allow CPA claims on a case by case basis,
depending on the level of sophistication of the horse purchaser. 52°
Thus, the experienced horse purchaser in Cohen still would not re-
ceive relief, but unsophisticated purchasers like the Millers could,
even if they purchased a Thoroughbred. 321
The interpretation of Kentucky's CPA in Cohen is not the only ex-
ample of limits to CPA claims. 322
 Like the warranty of merchantability,
which only applies to transactions between a merchant and purchaser,
some CPAs do not include isolated sales by one-time merchants in the
definition of trade or commerce.323
 Consequently, in such states, if the
seller is a one-time merchant, the purchaser cannot recover under
either the CPA or a breach of implied warranty of merchantabifity. 524
The purchaser can potentially recover, however, under the U.C.C.
314 See id.
315 See Cohen, 712 F. Stipp. at 1272.
316 Sec id.
317 Sec Miller, supra note 12. at 530-31; Tilton, supra note I. at 541.
315 See 712 F. Stipp. at 1272; SHELDON & CARTER, SUM note 17, at 31.
519 See 712 F. Supp. at 1272.
320 See id.; supra note 148 and accompanying text.
311 See 712 F. Stipp. at 1272.
522 See id.; SitEinoN & CARTER, SUM note 17, at 35.
525 See SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 17, at 38; Cohan, supra note 12, at 667.
924 See SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 17, at 38; Cohan, supra note 12, at 667.
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with a breach of express warranty or implied warranty for a particular
purpose claim, which do not depend on the seller's merchant
status. 325 Most importantly, however, because CPAs vary from state to
state, a transaction actionable under one state's CPA is not necessarily
actionable under another state's CPA.326 Thus, before a deceived
horse purchaser files a CPA claim, the purchaser must first determine
whether the particular state's CPA applies. 527 These limits demon-
strate that there are a small number of instances where U.C.C. claims
are better than CPA claims. 328 Overall, however, for the various rea-
sons discussed above, CPA claims provide greater protection for un-
sophisticated horse purchasers whom sellers have deceived.329 There-
fore, duped purchasers should always attempt to file a CPA claim
against a deceptive horse seller.3"
CONCLUSION
Many horse purchasers, like the Millers, are first-time purchasers
with little experience in the equine industry. These unsophisticated
horse purchasers often defer to the judgment of a more knowledge-
able seller, and thus are highly susceptible to deceptive and unfair
sales practices. In situations in which unscrupulous horse sellers take
advantage of these purchasers by inducing them to purchase a defec-
tive horse, the purchasers often cannot receive relief through con-
tract-based U.C.C. claims. CPA claims, however, address this inequity
by providing duped horse purchasers another source of relief that is
not dependent on contract principles. Therefore, the flexible stan-
dards of CPAs, based on protecting consumers from market inequi-
ties, allow unsophisticated horse purchasers to obtain relief even
when the U.C.C. does not. Additionally, CPA claims often provide
more extensive monetary remedies than U.C.C. claims. Consequently,
CPAs can often provide the best avenue of redress for duped horse
purchasers saddled with a lame horse.
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